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A New Standard of Review in Free Exercise Cases:
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana
Employment & Security Division.
In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Divi-
sion, the United States Supreme Court was called upon to clarify the ap-
propriate level of review to be applied in cases which examine the first
amendment right to free exercise of religion. The Court ruled that the "com-
pelling state interest" test is the proper standard to be used. The Court
also accorded first amendment protection to beliefs which are not shared
by other members of a religious group and which are instead the unique
interpertation of an individual member and not acceptable, logical, consis-
ten or comprehensible to others.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security
Division,' the United States Supreme Court was asked to deter-
mine whether interference with the free exercise of religion may
be constitutionally tolerated when such interference results from
the application of facially neutral welfare legislation well within
the acknowledged police powers of a state.2 Prior decisions of
the Court had left the question largely unresolved because of an
unwillingness or inability to clearly define the appropriate test to
be applied. In Thomas, the Court applied the "compelling state
interest" test and ruled that Thomas could not be denied unem-
ployment compensation benefits for terminating his employment
with a foundry producing turrets for military tanks, when his reli-
gious beliefs prevented him from participating in the production
of war materials. The case is significant both because it estab-
lishes a well defined test to be applied in free exercise cases, and
because it broadens the range of beliefs included under the pro-
1. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
2. The authority of the state to enact such a statute is granted under.
what is commonly called the police power - a power which the State did
not surrender when becoming a member of the Union under the Constitu-
tion. Although this Court has refrained from any attempt to define the
limits of that power, . . . the police power of a State must be held to em-
brace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legisla-
tive enactment as will protect the public health and public safety.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
tection of the first amendment to those that are neither well de-
fined nor clearly articulated.
Although earlier cases had afforded protection to the free exer-
cise of readily identifiable tenets of a recognized religious faith,
the decision in Thomas extends first amendment protection to be-
liefs which are not shared by other members of a religious group,
and which appear to be the unique interpretation of an individual
member and not "acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensi-
ble to others."3 So long as the religious belief is honestly and in
good faith held, and not so "bizarre, so clearly non-religious in
motivation as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Ex-
ercise Clause," 4 under Thomas, the Court will not subject it to
further scrutiny.
In analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Thomas, this note
will examine the history of the free exercise clause and the vari-
ous approaches the Court has taken in its effort to safeguard the
liberties embodied therein.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a
long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable cita-
del of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through
bitter experience that it is not within the power of government to invade
that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance
or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the State is
firmly committed to a position of neutrality. Though the application of
that rule requires interpretaion of a delicate sort, the rule itself is clearly
and concisely stated in the words of the First Amendment. 5
As made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment,6 the first amendment commands that a state "shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."7 To fully appreciate the significance of the
first amendment, it is necessary to first review the background
and environment of the period in which the amendment was
drafted and adopted.
Many of the early colonists in America left their homes in Eu-
rope to avoid religious persecution, hoping to find freedom to ex-
3. 450 U.S. at 712.
4. Id. at 713.
5. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963)
(holding that the establishment clause prohibited a state from requiring that
passages from the Bible be read or the Lord's Prayer be recited in the public
schools).
6. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (holding that religious
handbilling is not made commercial merely because religious materials were sold
rather than donated).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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ercise religions of their own choosing in the new world.8
Governments took extreme measures in their efforts to force loy-
alty to the religious group currently in favor. To those who failed
to attend government-estaLblished churches, expressed disbelief of
their doctrines, spoke disrespectfully of the views propounded by
their ministers, or failed to pay taxes and tithes to support them,
punishments were meted out. To perpetuate in the new land the
ways of the old, the charters granted by England authorized those
who received them to establish churches in the colonies which all
settlers, whether or not they shared in the belief, would be re-
quired to attend and to support. Many of the old world evils of
religious persecution and oppression began to be duplicated in
the new.9 Burgeoning religious intolerance, and the imposition of
taxes to pay ministers' salaries and build churches espousing be-
liefs they did not share, eventually stirred the colonists into tak-
ing action to secure the religious freedoms they left Europe to
find. "The people... reached the conviction that individual reli-
gious liberty could be achieved best under a government which
was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist
any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious
individual or group."10 Thus the religion clauses of the first
8. The centuries immediately before and contemporaneous with the colo-
nization of America had been filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecu-
tions, generated in large part by established sects determined to maintain
their absolute political and religious supremacy. With the power of gov-
ernment supporting them, at: various times and places, Catholics had per-
secuted Protestants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics, Protestant
sects had persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics of one shade of be-
lief had persecuted Catholics of another shade of belief, and all of these
had from time to time persecuted the Jews.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947) (upheld New Jersey legislation
designating tax raised funds to reimburse cost of bus fares for parochial school
students as part of a general program under which New Jersey pays such fares for
pupils attending public and other schools). See generally SWEET, RELIGION IN CO-
LONIAL AMERICA (1941).
9. Catholics found themselves hounded and proscribed because of their
faith; Quakers who followed their conscience went to jail; Baptists were
peculiarly obnoxious to certain dominant Protestant sects; men and wo-
men of varied faiths who happened to be in a minority in a particular lo-
cality were persecuted because they steadfastly persisted in worshipping
God only as their own consciences dictated. And all of these dissenters
were compelled to pay tithes and taxes to support government-sponsored
churches whose ministers preached inflammatory sermons designed to
strengthen and consolidate the established faith by generating a burning
hatred against dissenters.
330 U.S. at 10.
10. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 11.
amendment were drafted.
The meaning and scope of the first amendment, designed to
prevent laws respecting the establishment of religion and protect
the free exercise thereof, have been analyzed on several occa-
sions by the Court with varying results. In Reynolds v. United
States," decided in 1878, the Court examined the history of the
first amendment and the evils it was intended forever to suppress.
It gave special weight to the comments made by Thomas Jeffer-
son in his reply to an address by the Danbury Baptist
Association:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship; that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only,
and not opinions, - I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and State.
Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of
the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress
of those sentiments which tend to restore man to all his natural rights,
convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties. 12
Because Jefferson was a leader among the advocates of reli-
gious freedom, the Court accepted his declaration of the scope
and effect of the amendment as authoritative. The Court held
that "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation
of social duties or subversive of good order."' 3 The Court rea-
soned that to excuse a man's otherwise criminal actions because
of his religious beliefs "would be to make the professed doctrines
of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government
could exist only in name under such circumstances."' 4 A dichot-
omy was thus held to exist between religious beliefs, which were
sacred from interference, and religious practices, which were sub-
ject to legislative enactments, when in violation of social duties or.
subversive of good order.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 15 decided over half a century later,
the Court again held that while freedom of belief is absolute and
inviolate, the freedom to act is subject to regulation for the pro-
11. 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (holding that that legislature may enact laws prohibiting
bigamy despite the resulting interference with the tenets of the Mormon religion,
because the practice of bigamy is in violation of social duties and subversive of
good order).
12. Id. at 164.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 167.
15. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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tection of society.' 6 The Court in Cantwell stated that "[i]n every
case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attain-
ing a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected free-
dom."' 7 Although at first blush the language employed by the
Court in Cantwell sounds like the traditional "rational basis"
test,18 closer examination reveals that the Court actually applied
a balancing approach.' 9 In concluding that a statute which re-
quired a member of the Jehovah's Witness faith to obtain a certifi-
cate from the public welfare council as a condition to soliciting
support for his religious views constituted a prohibited restraint
on his free exercise of religion, the Court stated:
The general regulation, ir the public interest, of solicitation, which does
not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay
the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even
though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would
not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of reli-
gion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.20
However, where the secretary of the public welfare council exer-
cises his own judgment and opinions in deciding whether or not a
particular cause is a "religious" one, "[s]uch a censorship of reli-
gion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of
liberty protected by the First Amendment and included in the lib-
erty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth."2 1
Cantwell, then, departed from the Court's earlier decision in
Reynolds in its holding that while a state's reasonable interfer-
ence with an individual's religious practices is permissible, an un-
reasonable obstruction "is to lay a forbidden burden upon the
exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution."22 No longer
were all state regulations of religious practices (in contrast to reli-
gious beliefs) permissible.
16. 'The Amendment embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and free-
dom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things the second cannot be."
Id. at 303-04.
17. Id.
18. Developed in the context of substantive due process, the "rational basis"
test requires only that "the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. ... "
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
19. "The State's policy would weigh heavily in any challenge of the law as in-
fringing constitutional limitations." 310 U.S. at 307-08.
20. Id. at 305.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 307.
In Prince v. Massachusetts, 23 the Court was presented with the
conflict between the proselytism required by the tenets of the Je-
hovah's Witness faith and the state's prohibition of child labor. A
nine-year-old girl and her mother were selling religious
magazines on a public street in contravention of a state statute
prohibiting minors from engaging in such activities. The Court,
appearing to employ the "compelling state interest" test,24 held
that the state's interest in protecting children from the harmful
consequences of work permitted the consequential infringement
on the minor's free exercise of religion.25 Again, in Cleveland v.
United States, 26 the Court held that the defense of one's actions
as merely being in compliance with the dictates of one's faith is
inadequate to excuse the breach of a law protecting an important
societal interest. In Cleveland, a Mormon polygamist was
charged with violating the Mann Act 27 when he transported a wo-
man across state lines for the purpose of entering into a plural
marriage. In defense, the petitioner stated that he was motivated
by his religious beliefs to engage in polygamy, 28 and that to
charge him with the offense would be an interference with his
free exercise of religion. The Court was singularly unimpressed
with this defense: "If upheld, it would place beyond the law any
act done under claim of religious sanction. But it has long been
held that the fact that polygamy is supported by a religious creed
affords no defense in a prosecution for bigamy."29 Without pro-
viding an indication of the method used to reach its conclusion
other than its reliance on Reynolds, the Court determined that
the protection granted by the free exercise clause was insufficient
23. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
24. Developed in the context of equal protection controversies involving sus-
pect classifications or the infringement of fundamental liberties, the test requires
that state legislation interfering with the exercise of a fundamental right be neces-
sary to promote a compelling state interest. See generally Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Pr6tection, 86 HAnv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
25. While the Court held that the state's interest was compelling enough to
overcome the infringement on the minor's free exercise of religion, the Court did
indicate that an identical statute for adults or all persons generally would clearly
be invalid. 321 U.S. at 167.
26. 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
27. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
28. An accepted doctrine of the Mormon Church was:
that it was the duty of male members of [the] Church, circumstances per-
mitting, to practice polygamy; ... that this duty was enjoined by different
books which the members of [the] Church believed to be of divine origin,
... [and] that the failing or refusing to practice polygamy. . . would be
punished, and that the penalty for such failure and refusal would be dam-
nation in the life to come.
Reynolds v. United States, 89 U.S. 145, 161 (1878).
29. 329 U.S. at 20.
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to justify the practice of polygamy. In both Prince and Cleveland,
the Court held that where the exercise of a religious belief con-
flicts with an important public interest, practices otherwise pro-
tected under the free exercise clause must yield.
In Braunfeld v. BroUn, 30 decided in 1961, the Court held that
where the purpose and effect of legislation is to advance the
state's secular goals, the statute is constitutionally valid "despite
its indirect burden on religious observance unless the state may
accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a
burden."3 ' In Braunfeld, Jewish merchants sought an exception
from the Sunday closing laws, claiming that their faith required
them to remain closed on their Sabbath and that, therefore, to re-
main closed on Sunday put them at an economic disadvantage in
relation to merchants of other faiths who were not so compelled
to close both days.32 In upholding the constitutionality of the
Sunday closing law, the Court applied a "rational basis" test. "To
strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which
imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e.,
legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice it-
self, would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legisla-
ture."33 The Court recognized that in a country composed of
individuals holding so many different religious philosophies and
beliefs "it cannot be expected, much less required, that legislators
enact no law regulating conduct that may in some way result in
an economic disadvantage to some religious sects and not to
others because of the special practices of the various religions." 34
Three Justices dissented to the majority's opinion in Braun-
feld.3 5 In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that where funda-
mental liberties are infringed, the application of a rational basis
30. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
31. Id. at 607.
32. Appellant's argument was that the result of imposing Sunday closing laws
"will either compel appellants to give up their Sabbath observance, a basic tenet
of the Orthodox Jewish faith, or will put appellants at a serious economic disad-
vantage if they continue to adher to their Sabbath." Id. at 602.
33. Id. at 606.
34. Id.
35. Justices Brennan and Stewart concurred regarding the findings on the es-
tablishment clause, but dissented from the majority's holding regarding the free
exercise clause. Justice Frankfurter filed a separate concurring opinion and Jus-
tice Douglas dissented.
test is hardly adequate to safeguard the liberty.36 Justice Bren-
nan concluded that questions concerning the infringement of first
amendment freedoms demand nothing short of the strict scrutiny
afforded by the "compelling state interest" test.37 Justice Stewart
stated that he substantially agreed with Justice Brennan's dis-
sent, but he did not indicate whether he agreed specifically with
Brennan's application of a compelling state interest test. Taking a
different approach altogether, Justice Douglas argued3 8 that the
selection of Sunday as the uniform day of rest was largely made
in conformance with the majority's religious beliefs and for that
reason both the issue of establishment of religion and that of free
exercise were raised.
There is an "establishment" of religion in the constitutional sense if any
practice of any religious group has the sanction of law behind it. There is
an interference with the "free exercise" of religion if what in conscience
one can do or omit doing is required because of the religious scruples of
the community. 3 9
Although the majority held that Sunday closing laws did not im-
permissibly infringe free exercise of religion, the lack of agree-
ment among the Justices on the issue was manifest.
On facts substantially similar to those in Thomas, the subject of
this note, the Court in Sherbert v. Verner 4O held a law denying un-
employment compensation to a Seventh-Day Adventist, who, be-
cause of her religious beliefs was unable to work on her Sabbath,
to be an impermissible restraint on her free exercise of religion.
The Court, speaking through Justice Brennan, applied the "com-
pelling state interest" test. "It is basic that no showing merely of
a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suf-
fice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for per-
missible limitation.' "41 After determining that the disqualifica-
36. The first question to be resolved, however, is somewhat broader than
the facts of this case. That question concerns the appropriate standard of
constitutional adjudication in cases in which a statute is assertedly in con-
flict with the First Amendment, whether that limitation applies of its own
force, or as absorbed through the less definite words of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court in such cases is not confined to the narrow in-
quiry whether the challenged law is rationally related to some legitimate
legislative end. Nor is the case decided by a finding that the State's inter.
est is substantial and important, as well as rationally justifiable.
336 U.S. at 611 (Justice Brennan concurring and dissenting).
37. Significantly, Justice Brennan's dissent cites to Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944), for authority. In Prince, the Court applied the "compelling
state interest" test. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
38. Justice Douglas' dissent is included in his dissent to McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 561-81 (1961) also a Sunday closing law case.
39. Id. at 576-77.
40. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
41. Id. at 403, (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
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tion for benefits imposed a burden on the free exercise of
appellant's religion,42 the Court stated that "to condition the avail-
ability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a
cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the
free exercise of her constitutional liberties." 43 Finally, the Court
turned to consider whether some compelling state interest en-
forced in the eligibility provisions of the state statute justified the
infringement of Mrs. Sherbert's first amendment rights. None
was found. The Court distinguished Braunfeld on its facts, find-
ing that the burden on religious practices there was "less direct"
and that the State's interest in providing a uniform day of rest
was strong.44 Until its decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 45 nine
years later, the majority of the Court was in agreement that the
"compelling state interest" was the appropriate test in situations
where a law neutral on its face impacted on an individual's free
exercise of religion.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court retreated somewhat from the
"compelling state interest" analysis employed in Sherbert. In
Yoder, the Court was asked to decide whether the application of
Wisconsin's compulsory education law violated the right to free
exercise of religion of members of the Old Order Amish faith.
The testimony at trial showed that the Amish people "believed, in
accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish communities gen-
erally, that their children's attendance at high school, public or
private, was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life."'46 Al-
though the Court upheld the parents' free exercise claim, it failed
to apply the Sherbert "compelling state interest" standard and in-
stead appears to have applied a balancing test.47 After listening
42. Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for
benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure
upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to
choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting bene-
fits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
order to accept work, on the other hand.
Id. at 404.
43. Id. at 406.
44. Although the majority only distinguishes Braunfeld, Justice Stewart, in a
concurring opinion, concluded that to reach its decision in Sherbert, the "Court
must explicitly reject the reasoning of Braunfeld v. Brown." Id. at 418.
45. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
46. Id. at 209. "Old Order Amish communities today are characterized by a
fundamental belief that salvation requires life in a church community separate
and apart from the world and worldly influence." Id. at 210.
47. Confusion as to the test applied unavoidably arises when the Court in-
to extensive testimony by experts in both the fields of education
and religion, the Court concluded that the state's requirement of
compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would endan-
ger if not destroy the free exercise of the Amish people's religious
beliefs. The Court held that:
In light of this convincing showing,. and weighing the minimal differ-
ence between what the State would require and what the Amish already
accept, it was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how
its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely
affected by granting an exemption to the Amish.4 8
Although the Court agreed that the state's interest in compulsory
education was a legitimate one, it held that the competing interest
of free exercise of religion overbalanced the state's interest.
With Yoder the free exercise of religion cases ended until
Thomas. Every decision has agreed that under the religion
clauses of the first amendment, religious beliefs are beyond the
reach of state control. Conduct, however, has not been so abso-
lutely protected. Even when religiously based, some activities of
individuals have been subject to regulation by the state, through
its exercise of general police powers to promote the health, safety,
and welfare of its citizens, or by the federal government in the ex-
ercise of its enumerated powers. 49 The decisions have yielded in-
consistent results because the Court has been unable to agree on
a uniform standard by which to judge an infringement. Thomas
provides that standard, the "compelling state interest" test.
HI. FACTS OF THE CASE
When Thomas first applied for a position in the roll foundry at
Blaw-Knox Foundry and Machinery Company, he did so at the
suggestion of another employee, also a Jehovah's Witness. He
listed under "hobbies" on his application form "Bible study" and
"Bible reading." Beyond the religious nature of the hobbies he
noted, Thomas gave no indication of his faith, Jehovah's Witness,
or any restrictions his faith made on his ability to perform his job.
cludes bits and pieces of several classic approaches: 'Thus a State's interest...
is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental
rights . . . ." 406 U.S. at 214 (emphasis added); "only those interests of the high-
est order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the
free exercise of religion." Id. at 215 (emphasis added); "[w]e turn, then, to the
State's broader contention that its interest in the system of compulsory education
is so compelling that even the established religious practices of the Amish must
give way." Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 235-36 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
49. See e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (conscientious objec-
tor); Braunfeld v. Brown, 336 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing law); Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor law); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878) (polygamy).
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In the roll foundry, Thomas worked with equipment fabricating
sheet steel to be used for various industrial purposes.
About a year later, Blaw-Knox decided to close its roll foundry
and emphasize the production of weaponry. The roll foundry em-
ployees were transferred to other departments. Thomas was
transferred to a department responsible for the fabrication of tur-
rets for military tanks. It became clear to Thomas on his first day
in the new department that his work involved the production of
armaments, something his personal religious beliefs strictly
forbade.
In an effort to find a position in a department not engaged in
the production of weaponry, Thomas checked the company bulle-
tin board listing plant openings. It was then Thomas realized that
all remaining departments were similarly engaged in the produc-
tion of weaponry. Realizing that a transfer to another department
within the company would not eliminate his problem, Thomas re-
quested Blaw-Knox to lay him off until non-weapons-related work
became available. This request was refused.5 0 Thomas explained
to the management that his religious beliefs prevented him from
participating in the production of weaponry or other war materi-
als, and he quit.
When he was unable to find other work, Thomas applied for un-
employment compensation benefits as provided for under the In-
diana Employment Security Act.51 An administrative hearing was
conducted at which Thomas, unrepresented by counsel, again
stated that he was unable to participate in the manufacture of
weaponry without violating his religious beliefs. He testified that
50. Management rejected Thomas' request because it did not anticipate the
availability of non-weapons-related work.
51. IND. CODE § 22-4-15-1 (amended 1980), in pertinent part, provided:
With respect to benefit periods including extended benefit periods es-
tablished subsequent to July 6, 1974, and before July 3, 1977, an individual
who has voluntarily left his employment without good cause in connection
with the work or who was discharged from his employment for just cause
shall be ineligible for waiting period or benefit rights for the week in
which the disqualifying separation occurred and until he has subse-
quently earned remuneration in employment equal to or exceeding the
weekly benefit amount of this claim in each of ten (10) weeks. The weeks
of a disqualification period remaining at the expiration of an individual's
benefit period will be carried forward to an extended benefit period or to
the benefit period of a subsequent claim only if the first week of such ex-
tended benefit period or subsequent benefit period falls within ten (10)
consecutive weeks from the beginning of the disqualification period im-
posed on the prior claim.
450 U.S. at 709-10 n.1.
after he was transferred to the tank turret department he was un-
comfortable with his work, believing it to be "unscriptural."
Thomas explained that he sought the counsel of a co-worker and
fellow member of the Jehovah's Witness faith about the conflict
their new duties posed with Thomas' reading of the Bible. Al-
though Thomas testified that his friend did not feel that his job at
Blaw-Knox violated any of the tenets of the Jehovah's Witness
faith, Thomas felt that it did. Unconvinced, Thomas concluded
that his friend's interpretation of the principles of their faith was
less strict than his own.
While the hearing officer was convinced that Thomas quit his
job at Blaw-Knox because of his religious convictions, 52 he con-
cluded that Thomas voluntarily terminated his employment with-
out good cause in connection with the work, a requirement of the
Indiana statute.5 3 Because he failed to establish the requisite
good cause, Thomas was found not to be entitled to benefits. The
findings and conclusions of the referee were adopted by the Re-
view Board, which affirmed the denial of benefits to Thomas.
On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's decision and held that the disqualifying provision of the
Indiana statute violated Thomas' first amendment guarantee to
the free exercise of religion.54 The appeals court applied the
"compelling state interest" test, in reliance on the Supreme
Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner:
Under the authority of Sherbert, we are compelled to hold that the dis-
qualifying provision of I.C.22-4-15-1 (Burns Code Ed. 1974), as it applies to
Thomas, casts an impermissible burden on his First Amendment guaran-
tee to the free exercise of his religion. Because the Board has conceded
that no "compelling state interest" exists to justify such a burden, we
must hold that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to Thomas. 5 5
The Supreme Court of Indiana examined the record and deter-
mined that Thomas voluntarily and without good cause in connec-
tion with his work left his employment with Blaw-Knox. 56
Further, the court was not convinced that Thomas was religiously
motivated to leave his job. "Thomas' reasons for leaving his em-
ployment were unique, personal and subjective." 57 Once it was
ruled that Thomas' beliefs were more philosophical than reli-
52. In his decision, the referee concluded that Thomas "continually searched
for a transfer to another department which would not be so armament related;
however, this did not materialize, and prior to the date of his leaving, claimant re-
quested a layoff, which was denied; and on November 6, 1975, claimant did quit
due to his religious convictions." 450 U.S. at 711-12 (emphasis in original).
53. See supra note 50.
54. Thomas v. Review Bd., 381 N.E.2d 888 (Ind. 1978).
55. Id. at 895.
56. Thomas v. Review Bd., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind. 1979).
57. Id. at 1130.
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gious, the Review Board's decision to deny him benefits was no
longer subject to the "compelling state interest" level of scrutiny
afforded to first amendment violations. Stripped of constitutional
protection to counter the state's legitimate interest in protecting
people from "the menace of periods of unemployment and to en-
courage stable employment,"5 8 the court ruled that the incidental
burden on Thomas' free exercise right was justified.
IV. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. Scope of Religious Beliefs Protected
The Indiana Supreme Court placed a great deal of weight on
the fact that Thomas was unable to narrowly define or clearly ar-
ticulate his religious beliefs. Testimony from the administrative
hearing was presented in the court's decision in an effort to
demonstrate that doubt existed as to whether Thomas quit for
religious or merely philosophical reasons.5 9
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Bur-
ger, stated that the job of the trier of fact is only to determine
whether Thomas honestly and in good faith believed 60 that his
religion prevented him from continuing his employment with
Blaw-Knox, not whether his interpretation of the tenets of the Je-
hovah's Witness faith was shared by others.
The determination of what is a religious belief or practice is more often
than not a difficult and delicate task, as the division in the Indiana
Supreme Court attests. However, the resolution of that question is not to
turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in ques-
tion; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or com-
prehensible to others to merit First Amendment protection.
6 1
Two issues were raised by the Indiana court in support of their
view that Thomas' views were merely philosophical and not enti-
tled to constitutional protection. The first was that Thomas was
"struggling" with his religious beliefs and his views were incon-
sistent. That Thomas was able to differentiate religiously be-
tween working for United States Steel producing the raw steel
58. Id. at 1129.
59. Id. at 1131-33.
60. The phrase "honestly and in good faith" appeared first in United States v.
Boliard, 322 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1944} (holding that only the question of whether the
founders of the "I Am" movement honestly and in good faith believed their repre-
sentations and promises was properly before the trier of fact. The issue of religion
was not).
61. 450 U.S. at 714.
ultimately used in the production of tanks, as being scripturally
permissible, and the actual manufacture of a tank itself, scriptur-
ally impermissible, was more than the court could accept from a
"religious" belief. It has been well established by the Court that
"freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is
basic in a society of free men,"62 and as such is not required to be
purely logical nor reasonable:
It embraces the right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the
hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths. Her-
esy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they can-
not prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctines or
beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be in-
comprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken
of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law.
6 3
Where, as here, religious beliefs are honestly and in good faith
held, they are not subject to further scrutiny by the Court.
"Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because
the believer admits that he is 'struggling' with his position or be-
cause his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision
that a more sophisticated person might employ."64
The second avenue of attack pursued by the Indiana court was
that where another follower of the Jehovah's Witness faith be-
lieved there to be no religious prohibition against working on tank
turrets, any conflict felt by Thomas must stem from his philosoph-
ical rather than religious beliefs. Although including a caveat to
exclude non-religiously motivated or "bizarre" claims,65 the
Supreme Court held that the existence of intrafaith differences
between members of the same faith is commonplace and not
properly the subject of judicial examination.66 Based on the rec-
ord before it, composed of the conclusions drawn by the referee
and adopted by the Review Board,67 the Supreme Court held that
"Thomas terminated his employment for religious reasons." 68 In
so doing, the Court's decision in Thomas extended the first
amendment protection afforded religious beliefs to those which,
although honestly and in good faith held, are neither well defined
nor shared by all members of the religious group.
62. 322 U.S. at 86.
63. Id. at 86-87 (emphasis added).
64. 450 U.S. at 715.
65. "One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly non-
religious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise
Clause .. " Id.
66. "Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial function and
judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more
correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters
of scriptural interpretation." Id. at 716.
67. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 381 N.E.2d 888, 889-90 (Ind. 1978).
68. 450 U.S. at 716.
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B. The Applicable Standard
On facts generally similar to those in the present case, the
Court in Sherbert v. Verner held that absent some "compelling
state interest," South Carolina could not deny unemployment
compensation to Mrs. Sherbert because of her refusals to work on
Saturday in violation of her religious beliefs. Although the cases
that followed failed to apply Sherbert's standard and succeeded in
further obscuring the issue of the proper level of review, in
Thomas, the Court exhumed its earlier decision in Sherbert, es-
tablishing the "compelling state interest" test as the appropriate
standard to be applied in free exercise cases. 69
Before reaching the issue of whether or not a "compelling state
interest" was present to justify resulting interference with the
free exercise of religion, the Court first addressed the threshold
issue of whether Thomas' first amendment right to free exercise
of religion had in fact been burdened by the state's refusal to
grant him unemployment compensation benefits. In Everson v.
Board of Education, 70 the Court ruled that a state may not "ham-
per its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion" by ex-
cluding "individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans,
Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the
members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it,
from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation."71 In
Sherbert, the Court reasoned that if Mrs. Sherbert was denied eli-
gibility for unemployment benefits as a result solely of the prac-
tice of her religion, her right to free exercise of religion had been
burdened. The Court held that to condition the receipt of benefits
on the violation of a cardinal principle of her religious faith effec-
tively penalized the free exercise of religion.72 The Court found
that Thomas faced substantially the same choice Mrs. Sherbert
had faced "between fidelity to religious belief or cessation of
work" and that while the compulsion may have been indirect, a
significant infringement upon free exercise nonetheless
resulted.73
69. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
70. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See supra note 8.
71. Id. at 16.
72. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
73. 450 U.S. at 717. While Mrs. Sherbert was dismissed because she refused to
work on Saturdays and Thomas voluntarily left his employment, the situations
were nearly indistinguishable in that "the termination flowed from the fact that
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because
of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pres-
sure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a
burden upon religion exists. While this compulsion may be indirect, the
infringement upon free exercise is nevertheless substantial.
7 4
Significantly, although Mrs. Sherbert was practicing a recog-
nized tenet of her faith in refusing to work on her Sabbath,
Thomas' protected belief was not shared by other members of his
religious alliance. This difference marks the departure point of
Thomas from its predecessors. In Thomas, the Supreme Court
greatly expanded the free exercise clause to protect beliefs which
are not "acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to
others."75
The argument propounded by the State that the burden upon
Thomas' free exercise of religion was only the indirect result of
otherwise neutral welfare legislation, and was for that reason per-
missible, was rejected by the Court. It has been well established
that legislation which applies uniformly to all and does not on its
face discriminate against or among religions may still not satisfy
the constitutional requirement of government equality where its
effect is to unduly burden the free exercise of religion.7 6
A state may justify an otherwise impermissible infringement
upon the free exercise of religion where it can show that the legis-
lation employed is the least restrictive means of achieving some
"compelling state interest."77 In Thomas, the State argued that
the disqualifying clause of the Indiana Unemployment Compen-
sation Statute served two valid purposes: "(1) to avoid the wide-
spread unemployment and the consequent burden on the fund
resulting if people were permitted to leave jobs for 'personal' rea-
sons; and (2) to avoid a detailed probing by employers into job
applicants' religious beliefs."78
Although the Supreme Court agreed that the state's interests
were important, it did not find them to be compelling.7 9 The
''compelling state interest" standard requires that the state
demonstrate more than the mere possiblity that "widespread un-
the employment, once acceptable, became religiously objectionable because of
changed conditions." Id. at 718.
74. Id. at 717-18.
75. Id. at 714.
76. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory educa-
tion); Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 644 (1970) (property tax exemption); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment compensation benefits).
77. See supra note 24.
78. 450 U.S. at 718-19.
79. "[W]e must conclude that the interests advanced by the State do not jus-
tify the burden placed on the free exercise of religion." Id.
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employment" will result if people are not forced to choose be-
tween upholding the tenets of their faith and receiving state
unemployment compensation benefits. No such objection appears
to have been made by the Review Board. In addition, the State
introduced no evidence tending to show that undesired "detailed
probing by employers into job applicants' religious beliefs"80 will
result or that it has occurred in states currently permitting excep-
tions to their disqualifying provision to accomodate religious dif-
ferences. Concluding that the State failed to introduce interests
sufficiently compelling to warrant the burden on Thomas' free ex-
ercise of religion, the Cour-t concluded that Thomas would be enti-
tled to receive benefits, unless the granting of such benefits would
violate the establishment clause of the first amendment.
C. The Establishment Question
The final argument raised by the State in favor of denying
Thomas benefits is that to, force the State to pay Thomas benefits
would involve the State in the establishment of religion, strictly
prohibited by the first amendment.81 In Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, 82 the Court upheld a New Jersey statute designating tax
raised funds to reimburse parents of parochial school children for
bus fares as part of a general program under which it pays the
fares of all pupils attending public and other schools. The Ever-
son decision required that "the state be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not
require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to
be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them."8 3
Permitting an exception to Indiana's disqualifying provision for
Thomas' religious beliefs neither handicaps nor favors Jehovah's
Witnesses generally or Thomas individually; it merely puts
Thomas on equal footing with other applicants. The Court con-
cluded that the tension which necessarily exists between the two
religion clauses was resolved through their decision in Sherbert:
In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the 'establishment' of
the Seventh Day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension of
80. Id.
81. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ......
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The establishment clause has been made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940).
82. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
83. Id. at 18.
unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worship-
pers reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality
in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involve-
ment of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Es-
tablishment Clause to forestall.8 4
Although such a resolution of the establishment issue seems at
first perfunctory, a closer examination reveals that it was not.
Establishment questions generally arise in situations where
either a state or the federal government has enacted legislation
which has in some way been viewed as favoring, or "establishing"
a religion.85 Traditionally the establishment clause has been held
to mean at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go
to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for enter-
taining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance
or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
84. 374 U.S. at 409.
85. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a university permit-
ting students and others to use its property for secular purposes must also furnish
facilities to religious groups for the purpose of religious worship); Committee for
Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (held New York law providing financial
assistance to non-public elementary and secondary school invalid as violative of
the establishment clause because the "effect inevitably is to subsidize and ad-
vance the religious mission of sectarian schools."). Id. at 779-80; Tilton v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) .(upheld federal grants of funds for the construction of
facilities to be used for clearly secular purposes by public and non-public institu-
tions of higher learning); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (held legislation
providing salary supplement to teachers at non-public schools where average per
pupil expenditure was below average for secular education to be the fostering of
an "excessive entanglement" between government and religion in contradiction to
the establishment clause); Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upheld state
tax exemptions for real property owned by religious organizations and used solely
for religious worship); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upheld New
York law authorizing the provision of secular textbooks for all children in grades
7-12 attending public and non-public schools); School Dist. of Abington Township
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that the establishment clause prohibited
a state from requiring that passages from the Bible be read or the Lord's Prayer
be recited in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that the
establishment clause prohibited state officials from composing an official state
prayer and requiring its daily recitation in the public schools); McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing law sustained despite fact that undenia-
ble effect was to render it somewhat more likely that residents would respect
religious institutions and even attend church); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203 (1948) (holding that the "release time" program in the public schools for
religious instruction was a utilization of tax established and supported public
school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith in contravention of the
establishment clause); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1948) (upheld legisla-
tion designating tax raised funds to reimburse parents of parochial school children
for cost of bus fares as part of general program under which it paid the fares of
pupils attending public and other schools).
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Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, par-
ticipate in the affairs of any religious organization or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of reli-
gion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church
and State.'8
6
In Thomas, the enacted legislation was not the subject of the es-
tablishment argument, but rather an exception to the legislation
was. So long as the exception itself neither handicaps nor favors
a religion, "establishment" is not an issue. An indirect and inci-
dental effect beneficial to, a religious institution has never been
thought to be a sufficient defect to warrant the invalidation of a
state law.8 7 A rather lengthy dissent notwithstanding, the facts of
Thomas pose no establishment issue.
V. THE DISSENT
In his dissent to Thomas, Justice Rehnquist attacks the major-
ity decision on the ground, that it "reads the Free Exercise Clause
too broadly and it fails to squarely acknowledge that such a read-
ing conflicts with many of . . . [the Court's] Establishment
Clause cases." 88 The dissent begins with the following summary
of the majority opinion: "The Court today holds that the State of
Indiana is constitutionally required to provide direct financial
assistance to a person solely on the basis of his religious be-
liefs. '89 If Justice Rehnquist truly believes that Thomas stands
for the proposition that Indiana is "constitutionally required to
provide direct financial assistance" to people solely on the basis
of their religious beliefs, it is understandable why he would be
dismayed at the decision. Only the most creative reading of the
Court's holding would yield such an interpretation. On the con-
trary, the Court in Thomas held only that one is not to be pun-
ished for his religious beliefs. If Thomas refused to accept
suitable employment when offered to him, he would be denied
benefits just as anyone else would be. The decision of the Court
merely established that, initially, all those seeking unemployment
benefits from the State of Indiana should start out on the same
footing.
Justice Rehnquist next examined the increasing "tension" be-
tween the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first
86. 30 U.S. at 15-16.
87. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) See supra note 85.
88. 450 U.S. at 727. For a suramary of such cases see generally supra note 85.
89. Id. at 720 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
amendment. Three factors were offered as those contributing to
the current conflict between the two religious clauses: (1) An in-
crease in social welfare legislation, (2) the Court's decision that
the first amendment was made applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, and (3) an "overly expansive inter-
pretation of both clauses" by the Court.90 "By broadly construing
both clauses, the Court has constantly narrowed the channel be-
tween the Scylla and Charybdis through which any state or fed-
eral action must pass in order to survive consitutional scrutiny."9 1
Rehnquist's argument that the Court reads the free exercise
clause too broadly is premised on the Court's holding in Braun-
feld v. Brown. 92 It is clear that Braunfeld interprets the reach of
the free exercise clause more narrowly than does Thomas. So is
the fact that they are applying different standards.93 If Justice
Rehnquist is lobbying for the application of the "rational basis"
test, his reliance on Braunfeld is appropriate; if not, his reliance is
misplaced. Thomas is clear; the proper standard to apply is the
''compelling state interest."
Immediately following his criticism of the Court's decisions
under the free exercise clause, those under the establishment
clause came under attack. "The Court's treatment of the Estab-
lishment Clause issue is equally unsatisfying." 94 Rehnquist
states that the decision in Thomas is inconsistent with prior es-
tablishment clause cases. 95 Although that statement itself is sub-
ject to debate,96 more importantly, Rehnquist fails to appreciate
that the facts in Thomas, resolved as they are under Sherbert, fail
to present an establishment issue. As was discussed previously,
an establishment problem is most often posed by the imposition
of legislation tending to advance or favor a religion or religions. 97
90. Id. at 721.
91. Id.
92. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text. Braunfeld applies the "ra-
tional basis" test, while Thomas applies the "compelling state interest" standard.
94. 450 U.S. at 724 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. For this proposition Rehnquist cites Everson, in which the Court con-
cluded that the establishment clause bespeaks a government "stripped of all
power ... to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions .... and no state
"can pass laws which aid one religion [or] all religions." 330 U.S. at 11, 15. Since
Everson held that the establishment clause was not violated by the use of tax
raised funds to reimburse parents of parochial school children for the cost of bus
fares as part of the general program under which it paid the bus fares of pupils
attending public and other schools, and is widely considered to be an example of
the outer reaches of permissible state action, it is unimaginable why Rehnquist is
citing the case in support of a more narrow interpretation of the establishment
clause. See also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 85 and 95 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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In Thomas, the Court :merely excepts certain religiously moti-
vated conduct from an otherwise neutral disqualifying provision
of state welfare legislation. Contrary to Rehnquist's dissent, the
decision does not require Indiana to alter the existing legisla-
tion.98 It merely states that such legislation cannot be applied to
Thomas so that he is forced "to choose between following the
precepts of [his] religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand,
and abandoning the precepts of [his] religion in order to accept
work, on the other hand."99
Undoubtedly "tension" exists between the free exercise and es-
tablishment clauses of the first amendment, and perhaps for the
reasons outlined by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent. Thomas,
however, was not the proper forum for such a discussion. The
facts of Thomas restrict its application to the free exercise clause
alone, as dictated by Sherbert. Rehnquist's misstatements and
overstatements of the Court's holding were largely unfounded
and off target. 0 0
VI. IMPACT OF THE CASE
Prior to the Thomas decision, the question of whether interfer-
ence with the free exercise of religion may be constitutionally tol-
erated when such interference resulted from the application of
facially neutral welfare legislation was left unresolved. From its
earliest decision in Reynolds v. United States to its more recent
opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court seemed unable to decide
on the appropriate test to be applied. A variety of approaches had
been tried over the years from a "balancing" test'01 through the
"compelling state interest" standard of Sherbert. 102
The Court's decision in Thomas is significant in two respects.
Most obviously, it breathed life into the Sherbert decision, con-
firming that the compelling state interest test is the appropriate
standard to apply in free exercise cases. Second, the decision
served to broaden the range of religious beliefs afforded protec-
98. "If Indiana were to legislate what the Court today requires - an unem-
ployment compensation law which permitted benefits to be granted to those per-
sons who quit their jobs for religious reasons - the statute would 'plainly' violate
the Establishment Clause as interpreted in such cases as Lemon and Nyquist."
450 U.S. at 726.
99. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 404.
100. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
tion under the first amendment to those which, although honestly
and in good faith believed, are not well defined or clearly articu-
lated, or shared by all members of the religious group.
The impact of the broadened range of religious beliefs will not
be immediately known. Perhaps as a cautionary measure Chief
Justice Burger included the caveat that to be protected, beliefs
cannot be too "bizarre" or insincerely motivated: "One can, of
course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreli-
gious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the
Free Exercise Clause." 103
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cantwell
v. Connecticut,0 4 until its decision in Thomas1 0 5 the issue of the
appropriate level of review to be applied in cases which examine
the first amendment right to free exercise of religion had been un-
clear. Without a clearly defined test to apply, courts faced an im-
possible task in rendering opinions on the issue, and litigants
were equally insecure in what arguments to make or which case
law to recite. While Braunfeld v. Brown 106 applied a "rational ba-
sis" level of review to a Jewish merchant seeking an exception to
the Sunday closing laws which imposed a financial burden on his
free exercise of religion, only two years later that same Court in
Sherbert v. Vernerl0 7 required South Carolina to justify its denial
of unemployment benefits (again imposing a financial burden on
the free exercise of religion) to a Seventh Day Adventist by a
"compelling state interest." No longer is the question of the ap-
propriate standard to be applied in free exercise cases left un-
resolved; in affirming Sherbert, the Thomas Court has clearly
established the "compelling state interest" test as the appropriate
standard to be used.108
103. 450 U.S. at 715.
104. See supra note 15.
105. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
106. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
107. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
108. The Thomas "compelling state interest" standard has been repeatedly
cited by other courts. See Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th
Cir. 1982) (high school association's rule forbidding basketball players to wear
hats or other headwear, with sole exception of headbands no wider than two in-
ches while playing, as applied to proscription of pinning yarmulkes with bobby
pins held not to violate free exercise clause of first amendment since yarmulkes
may be secured by other means); Weaver v. Jago, 675 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1982) (re-
quiring inmate to have his hair cut in conformity with prison regulations where
inmate subscribed to Cherokee religious belief that cutting of hair indicated dis-
grace, humiliation or death in family violated first amendment right to freedom of
religious expression); Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1981) (requirement
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Where earlier cases had provided protection to the free exercise
of accepted tenets of a recognized religious faith, the decision in
Thomas greatly expands the first amendment protection accorded
to beliefs which are not shared by other members of a religious
group and which are instead the unique interpretation of an indi-
vidual member and not "acceptable, logical, consistent or compre-
hensible to others."10 9 Where a religious belief is honestly and in
good faith held, and is not so bizarre or clearly non-religious in
motivation as to be excluded from first amendment protection,
under Thomas it will not be subjected to further scrutiny.
LYNN MCCUTCHEN GARDNER
of obtaining a social security number for a child prior to qualifying for Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children in contravention of father's religious belief that So-
cial Security numbers were the sign of the Antichrist, held to be in violation of
first amendment freedom of religion).
109. See supra note 3.

